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A B S T R A C T 
Bioengineering is a field in expansion. New technologies are appearing to provide a more efficient treat-
ment of diseases or human deficiencies. Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) constitute one example, 
these being devices with more computing, decision making and communication capabilities. Several 
research works in the computer security field have identified serious security and privacy risks in IMDs 
that could compromise the implant and even the health of the patient who carries it. This article surveys 
the main security goals for the next generation of IMDs and analyzes the most relevant protection mech-
anisms proposed so far. On the one hand, the security proposals must have into consideration the inherent 
constraints of these small and implanted devices: energy, storage and computing power. On the other 
hand, proposed solutions must achieve an adequate balance between the safety of the patient and the 
security level offered, with the battery lifetime being another critical parameter in the design phase. 
1. Introduction 
Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) are electronic devices 
implanted within the body to treat a medical condition, monitor 
the state or improve the functioning of some body part, or just to 
provide the patient with a capability that he did not possess before 
[47]. Current examples of IMDs include pacemakers and defibrilla-
tors to monitor and treat cardiac conditions; neurostimulators for 
deep brain stimulation in cases such as epilepsy or Parkinson; drug 
delivery systems in the form of infusion pumps; and a variety of 
biosensors to acquire and process different biosignals. 
Some of the newest IMDs have started to incorporate numerous 
communication and networking functions—usually known as 
"telemetry", as well as increasingly more sophisticated computing 
capabilities. This has provided implants with more intelligence and 
patients with more autonomy, as medical personnel can access 
data and reconfigure the implant remotely (i.e., without the patient 
being physically present in medical facilities). Apart from a signif-
icant cost reduction, telemetry and computing capabilities also 
allow healthcare providers to constantly monitor the patient's con-
dition and to develop new diagnostic techniques based on an Intra 
Body Network (IBN) of medical devices [9,10,107]. 
Evolving from a mere electromechanical IMD to one with more 
advanced computing and communication capabilities has many 
benefits but also entails numerous security and privacy risks for 
the patient. The majority of such risks are relatively well known 
in classical computing scenarios, though in many respects their 
repercussions are far more critical in the case of implants. 
Attacks against an IMD can put at risk the safety of the patient 
who carries it, with fatal consequences in certain cases. Causing 
an intentional malfunction of an implant can lead to death and, 
as recognized by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
such deliberate attacks could be far more difficult to detect than 
accidental ones [30]. Furthermore, these devices store and transmit 
very sensitive medical information that requires protection, as dic-
tated by European (e.g., Directive 95/46/ECC) and U.S. (e.g., CFR 
164.312) Directives [54,108]. 
The wireless communication capabilities present in many mod-
ern IMDs are a major source of security risks, particularly while the 
patient is in open (i.e., non-medical) environments. To begin with, 
the implant becomes no longer "invisible", as its presence could be 
remotely detected [20]. Furthermore, it facilitates the access to 
transmitted data by eavesdroppers who simply listen to the (inse-
cure) channel [44]. This could result in a major privacy breach, as 
IMDs store sensitive information such as vital signals, diagnosed 
conditions, therapies, and a variety of personal data (e.g., birth 
date, name, and other medically relevant identifiers). A vulnerable 
communication channel also makes it easier to attack the implant 
in ways similar to those used against more common computing 
devices [65,69,83], i.e., by forging, altering, or replying previously 
captured messages [43]. This could potentially allow an adversary 
to monitor and modify the implant without necessarily being close 
to the victim [85]. In this regard, the concerns of former U.S. 
vice-president Dick Cheney constitute an excellent example: he 
had his Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator (ICD) replaced by 
another without WiFi capability [116]. 
While there are still no known real-world incidents, several 
attacks on IMDs have been successfully demonstrated in the lab 
[44,73]. These attacks have shown how an adversary can disable 
or reprogram therapies on an ICD with wireless connectivity, and 
even inducing a shock state to the patient [33]. Other attacks 
deplete the battery and render the device inoperative [52], which 
often implies that the patient must undergo a surgical procedure 
to have the IMD replaced. Moreover, in the case of cardiac 
implants, they have a switch that can be turned off merely by 
applying a magnetic field [79]. The existence of this mechanism 
is motivated by the need to shield ICDs to electromagnetic fields, 
for instance when the patient undergoes cardiac surgery using 
electrocautery devices [19]. However, this could be easily exploited 
by an attacker, since activating such a primitive mechanism does 
not require any kind of authentication. 
The exploitation of a vulnerability in the IMD by an attacker can 
cause negative medical effects to the patient. Such effects are com-
monly known as "adverse events". Since each type of implant is 
devoted to treat a particular medical condition, the adverse effects 
that can be originated if the attacker succeeds are very varied [47]. 
In Fig. 1 we enumerate some of the damages an adversary could 
cause on a patient for the most commonly used IMDs. Attacks 
and their associated adverse events can be studied from both their 
extent and persistence point of view. The former measures the 
number of affected entities in the overall system, such as the 
IMD, the patient, other implants within the patient's IBN, and other 
devices outside it. The latter distinguishes whether the effects of 
the attack are temporary or permanent. 
In order to prevent attacks, it is imperative that the new gener-
ation of IMDs will be equipped with strong mechanisms guaran-
teeing basic security properties such as confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability. For example, mutual authentication between the 
IMD and medical personnel is essential, as both parties must be 
confident that the other end is who claims to be. In the case of 
the IMD, only commands coming from authenticated parties 
should be considered, while medical personnel should not trust 
any message claiming to come from the IMD unless sufficient guar-
antees are given. 
Preserving the confidentiality of the information stored in and 
transmitted by the IMD is another mandatory aspect. The device 
must implement appropriate security policies that restrict what 
entities can reconfigure the IMD or get access to the information 
stored in it, ensuring that only authorized operations are executed. 
Similarly, security mechanisms have to be implemented to protect 
the content of messages exchanged through an insecure wireless 
channel. 
Integrity protection is equally important to ensure that infor-
mation has not been modified in transit. For example, if the infor-
mation sent by the implant to the Programmer is altered, the 
doctor might make a wrong decision. Conversely, if a command 
sent to the implant is forged, modified, or simply contains errors, 
its execution could result in a compromise of the patient's physical 
integrity. 
Technical security mechanisms should be incorporated in the 
design phase and complemented with appropriate legal and 
administrative measures. Current legislation is rather permissive 
in this regard, allowing the use of implants like ICDs that do not 
incorporate any security mechanisms. Regulatory authorities like 
the FDA in the U.S or the EMA (European Medicines Agency) in 
Europe should promote metrics and frameworks for assessing the 
security of IMDs. These assessments should be mandatory by 
law, requiring an adequate security level for an implant before 
approving its use. Moreover, both the security measures supported 
on each IMD and the security assessment results should be made 
public. 
Prudent engineering practices well known in the safety and 
security domains should be followed in the design of IMDs. If hard-
ware errors are detected, it often entails a replacement of the 
implant, with the associated risks linked to a surgery. One of the 
main sources of failure when treating or monitoring a patient is 
precisely malfunctions of the device itself. These failures are 
known as "recalls" or "advisories", and it is estimated that they 
affect around 2.6% of patients carrying an implant. Furthermore, 
the software running on the device should strictly support the 
functionalities required to perform the medical and operational 
tasks for what it was designed, and no more [34,72,114]. 
Overview and organization: In this paper, we present a survey 
of security and privacy issues in IMDs, discuss the most relevant 
mechanisms proposed to address these challenges, and analyze 
their suitability, advantages, and main drawbacks. Throughout this 
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Fig. 1. Adverse events for four representative IMD types. 
work, we will find typical security issues such as eavesdropping, 
spoofing, or man-in-the-middle attacks, as well as classical prob-
lems like how to appropriately distribute cryptographic keys or 
how to control accesses in a secure but flexible manner. 
We start by providing an overview of current IMD technology in 
Section 2, including current standards for telemetry. Then, in 
Section 3 we discuss typical usage scenarios for patients carrying 
IMDs and the associated threat model, paying special attention to 
the various adverse events that could arise as a consequence of 
attacks against the implant. Subsequently in Section 4 we describe 
various trade-offs that should be taken into account when design-
ing mechanisms to preserve security and privacy in IMDs. Such 
trade-offs are intimately related to the scarcity of resources in 
the implant and to the need to guarantee the patient's safety even 
if this means that security mechanisms should be bypassed in 
some circumstances. Section 5 describes and analyzes a variety 
of security and privacy solutions specifically proposed for IMDs, 
ranging from mechanisms to protect the communication channel 
to access control models tailored for this domain. Finally, 
Section 6 summarizes the main issues introduced in this paper 
and discusses open problems and avenues for future research. 
2. Implantable medical devices 
An IMD is often defined as an electronic device that is perma-
nently or semi-permanently implanted on a patient with the pur-
pose of treating a medical condition, improving the functioning of 
some body part, or providing the user with a capability that he did 
not possess before [47]. These devices are often implanted around 
2-3 cm under the patient's skin and connected to the organ that 
needs treatment or monitoring. Cardiac implants (see Fig. 2) are 
possibly the most widely known example of IMDs, but many 
others are increasingly being used to deal with different medical 
conditions more efficiently than by traditional methods. The most 
common types include: 
Cardiac implanted devices. These include devices such as 
Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICD) and Pacemakers. 
They are designed to treat cardiac conditions by monitoring 
the heart's electrical activity and applying electrical impulses 
of suitable intensity and location in order to make the heart 
pump at the desired speed [124]. New models are equipped 
with pressure sensors capable of actively monitoring changes 
that could lead to a heart failure. This allows to alert the patient 
or the medical personnel if a pressure increment in the ventricle 
is detected, as this represents a hazard condition for the patient. 
Cardiac implants may also be equipped with accelerometers to 
measure the patient's physical activity level. This can be set as 
an input parameter to the IMD controller, allowing to adjust the 
cardiac stimulation frequency to the one that best suits each 
moment [111]. 
Neurostimulators. These devices transmit low-amplitude elec-
trical signals through one or more electrodes placed in different 
locations of the brain. These electrodes are implanted in very 
specific areas depending on the patient's condition. The process 
is known as Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) and allows to treat a 
variety of pathologies such as Parkinson, dystonia, epilepsy, or 
even depression that, in some cases, are resistant to medication 
after several years of treatment [75]. 
Drug Delivery Systems (DDS). A DDS consists of a pump and a 
catheter that are surgically implanted under the skin. Their 
function is to supply medication in a controlled, localized, and 
prolonged way. Since the medication goes directly to the target 
area, an infusion pump provides a considerable degree of con-
trol, which allows to use a lower dose than that required with 
oral medication. For instance, this type of implants have been 
successfully used to mitigate pain in cases of cancer where tra-
ditional medication does not have good results [68]. 
Biosensors. The implant consists of a sensor or a set of sensors 
placed inside the human body to monitor any part of it. They 
are capable of measuring certain physiological parameters and 
use such measures to make decisions. In this sort of implants 
there exists a special device that acts as a control node, commu-
nicating with the sensors and with other external entities (e.g., 
a programmer). The set of sensors and the control node are 
often regarded as a wireless biosensor network [13,24,118]. 
2.1. The new generation of IMDs with telemetry 
Healthcare systems incorporating numerous communication 
and networking functions have proliferated over the last years. 
This has made possible to develop medical sensor networks that, 
for instance, can monitor patients in their own homes 
[100,88,126,109]. Doctors, caregivers, or even the patient himself 
can thus conduct a continuous and more flexible control of his 
state, as well as access medical data remotely, communicate during 
an emergency, and even command various household appliances. 
This also promotes the autonomy of patients who, in many situa-
tions, are elderly people or individuals with reduced mobility. 
Similar communication and networking capabilities are 
increasingly being embedded into IMDs. Equipped with a radio 
transmitter, the IMD can communicate with an external device-
Fig. 2. Implantable medical device: pacemaker. 
generally known as "Programmer" or "Reader"—and send it phys-
iological data such as electrocardiogram (ECG) signals in the case 
of pacemakers and ICDs, that the doctor can use to track the 
patient's pathology. Apart from querying sensed data, the 
Programmer can also command the IMD to adjust or disable ther-
apies, perform software updates, etc. 
Augmenting IMDs with wireless communication and network-
ing capabilities has significant advantages, including: 
• It allows to constantly monitor the patient's physiological 
parameters and other symptomatology captured by the device, 
which reduces the time needed to regularly tracking medical 
conditions and, furthermore, causes less disruptions in the 
patient's daily activities. 
• Enhanced supervision and management of the IMD operation, 
which allows to address any problem that might arise and apply 
adequate correction measures in a shorter time. 
• The two previous items also imply a reduction in the overall 
costs involved in tracking the patient's condition and managing 
the operation of the IMD. 
• In the case of future IntraBody Networks (IBN) [9,10,107], com-
putation and analysis tasks could be shared among different 
networked devices, which will contribute to the development 
of new diagnostic techniques. 
In their current generation, not all types of IMDs support access 
to all their available functions through the wireless communica-
tion channel. The vast majority of IMDs can be reprogrammed 
remotely, which allows the doctor to modify therapies as required. 
The reverse link (i.e., from the IMD to the Programmer) is not pre-
sent in all of them. For instance, while pacemakers and ICDs can 
communicate in both directions, current neurostimulators can 
only receive reprogramming commands but they do not provide 
any information (e.g., sensed data) back to the Programmer. This 
fact has caused that most research works on advanced computa-
tional and networking issues related to IMDs, including the secu-
rity and privacy problems addressed in this paper, are commonly 
focused on cardiac implants. Nevertheless, new IMD designs are 
computationally more complex and are increasingly basing part 
of their functionality in the ability to communicate externally to 
perform diagnostic and therapy tasks. 
The main standards regulating telemetry for medical devices 
are: 
• Many non-implantable medical devices are compliant with the 
Wireless Medical Telemetry Services (WMTS) specification, 
which sets three operating frequency bands: 608-614 MHz, 
1395-1400 MHz, and 1427-1432 MHz [12,46]. This is a U.S. 
standard defined by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) in 2000 that is not internationally agreed, hence that its 
use is often restricted to the U.S. only. 
• IMDs operate under the Medical Implant Communication 
System (MICS) specification, which operates in the 402-
405 MHz band. MICS is a low-power (25 mW), unlicensed 
mobile radio service that facilitates data communications 
between the IMD and an external programmer. The communi-
cation range is about 2 m and the bandwidth is very low when 
compared with wireless communication technologies such as 
bluetooth or WiFi. The radio signals can go through and be 
transmitted within the human body due to its conductive char-
acteristics. The purpose of these communications can be access-
ing the measures taken by the implant or reconfiguring it to, for 
example, adjust the treatment. MICS compliant IMDs have 
proliferated in the last years, including pacemakers, ICDs, 
neurostimulators, hearing aids, and DDSs [11,26,102]. 
• Similarly to the WMTS specification, the Medical Device 
Radiocommunications Service (MedRadio) defines communica-
tion services for both implanted and wearable medical devices. 
The specification, which was approved by the FCC in 2009 [85], 
extends the MICS spectrum 1 MHz in both sides, covering a fre-
quency band from 401 to 406 MHz. The use of these frequencies 
in IMDs is well justified [16]: (1) At those frequencies, radio sig-
nals can easily propagate within the human body. (2) The 401-
406 MHz band is compatible with international regulations and 
does not interfere with other radio operations in the same band. 
Incorporating a wireless communication capability into an 
implant involves some special requirements that affect their 
design. One of the most important is that the radio frequency mod-
ule must consume very little power (e.g., 10 mW and up to 
100 mW for a glucose and ECG monitor, respectively [48]) in order 
to save the implant battery life. Additional design factors include 
the required communication range (typically from 1 up to 5 m 
[120]), the data transfer rate (e.g. 0.1 bps and up to 10 Kbps for a 
glucose and ECG monitor, respectively [48]), the environmental 
conditions in which the IMD will operate, and its size and cost 
[55,56,129]. 
Recently, the FDA has published guidelines for the industry on 
the design, testing, and use of wireless medical devices [27]. As sta-
ted, the security of wireless signals and data is an important issue in 
order to protect access to patient's data and hospital networks, and 
to prevent unauthorized communications with medical devices like 
IMDs or Programmers. Wireless medical devices must use crypto-
graphic techniques (i.e., encryption, authentication, secure key 
storage) to protect communications and accesses. The necessary 
security level is determined by the sort of threats, and their proba-
bility, to which the device is exposed, as well as the operating envi-
ronment and the consequences/damages on the patient in case of a 
security incident. For the design of secure solutions, the FDA sug-
gests that wireless medical devices include security measures to 
protect communications and accesses but also include software 
protections. Nowadays, the FDA is currently working on the design 
of recommendations for the management of cybersecurity in med-
ical devices [28]. Apart from the FDA, other organizations are con-
tributing to the elaboration of standards (e.g., X.1120 and 
X.1139), including tele-biometrics, mobile secure transmissions, 
secure transmission of personal health information, etc. [62]. 
3. Security assumptions 
In this section we first present the system model and then 
describe the usage scenarios. After that, the threat model is 
explained and finally the different types of adversaries are 
introduced. 
3.1. System model and usage scenarios 
Fig. 3 presents the main entities involved in the system and 
shows the possible communication interactions (linked to the 
usage scenarios) between these devices. The IMD will communi-
cate with a Programmer, which will be any entity/device autho-
rized to interact with the implant (e.g., medical personnel). In 
normal operation (i.e., while the implant has not detected an emer-
gency situation [102]), the Programmer has to initiate the commu-
nication with the IMD as stated by the FCC regulations. Since the 
radio channel is a shared communication medium, the program-
mer will listen to the channel until it detects that is not busy to 
establish the communication. The goal of this communication is 
either requesting data (e.g., ECG signals or insulin levels) or 
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Fig. 3. Typical usage scenario for IMDs. 
sending commands (e.g., treatment modifications). In the case of 
secure solutions, the IMD and the Programmer are authenticated 
and sensitive data is passed encrypted on the channel. 
Apart from the direct communication between the IMD and the 
Programmer, some authors have introduced the idea of using an 
external device (e.g, cloaker [22], shield [37], IMDGuard [127], 
etc.), which acts as a proxy. In this case, rather than establishing 
a direct connection with the Programmer, the IMD can delegate 
this task to an external device that authenticates the 
Programmer—initially there is a secure pairing between the IMD 
and the external device. Once the Programmer is authenticated 
(normal mode operation), this can communicate with the IMD 
using an encrypted channel via the external device. In emergency 
mode, the IMD has to answer even if the authentication fails— 
and, in some cases, the medical personnel must be able to disable 
the device easily. 
As the patient will generally move about different locations and 
may visit several doctors and hospitals, IMDs will not always 
communicate with the same, previously known device. 
Furthermore, the entities authorized to communicate with the 
implant can vary [43]. Potential attackers must be also considered, 
as not all signals received by the IMD will actually come from an 
authorized Programmer and, in many cases, their purpose could 
be malicious. Under these conditions, guaranteeing the security 
and privacy of the IMD and its data is essential to protect the safety 
of the patient. 
As described above, an IMD must operate under two different 
modes: normal and emergency. One major objective is to find a 
sensible trade-off between these two possible situations: 
A. Security in normal operation mode. The patient controls 
what entities can interact with his IMD. In this case, it is nec-
essary to implement both a strong access control mecha-
nism and cryptographic protocols in the communication 
link to thwart malicious and unauthorized accesses. The 
IMD must ignore indiscriminate data requests or device 
reprogramming commands. Ideally, the implant should be 
undetectable to unauthorized parties. Security mechanisms 
might be similar to those used in constrained devices like 
RFID tags or smart sensors (e.g., lightweight hash functions 
[4,5,41] or tiny block ciphers [60,66,67]). 
B. Security in emergency mode. As important as offering 
strong access control, secure communications, and even 
undetectability, is the ability of being accessible under an 
emergency condition. Consider a patient who enters an 
emergency room in a hospital different to the one he often 
visits. To further complicate matters, assume that the 
patient is visiting a foreign county. Even under these circum-
stances, the healthcare staff must be able to communicate 
with the implant, determine its type (e.g., model and brand), 
extract physiological data or information about the treat-
ment, and even update its configuration if required. Even 
in a secure scheme, under an emergency situation such as 
an urgent surgery of a patient who holds an ICD, in which 
it is mandatory to deactivate the implant, the IMD should 
always respond before deactivation. 
To understand the importance of emergency conditions, it 
would be useful to know the frequency of occurrence of these 
events. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge there are no 
public reports about emergencies involving patients that hold an 
IMD. Nevertheless, some statistics about pacemakers, which are 
one the most popular IMDs, may help to shed some light on this 
matter. For instance, lead complications are one of the principal 
causes of re-intervention in patients with heart diseases. In a 
recent retrospective study, Walker et al. [121] reported 1.4 events 
per 100 patient-years of follow-up for lead-related complications, 
including vein thrombosis, acute perforation, and dislodgement. 
This figure doubles if the population under study are children 
[84]. As for the pocket-related complications (e.g., infection, ero-
sion, or migration of the pacemaker), which is the other main cause 
of complications for pacemakers [40], the values are slightly 
higher: 1.9 events per 100 patient-years. Furthermore, the proba-
bility of re-intervention increases with every consecutive replace-
ment [6]. We acknowledge that re-intervention due to lead or 
pocket complications is, strictly speaking, not an emergency condi-
tion, since in most cases the surgery is planned. Nevertheless, both 
situations have in common the need to properly address any secu-
rity measures deployed in the IMD. It is the job of manufacturers, 
engineers, and physicians to evaluate the frequency and impact 
of those events in order to develop a rigorous risk model. 
A straightforward solution for emergency conditions that pro-
vides the necessary safety to the patient is to force the IMD to dis-
regard authentication and authorization mechanisms and process 
all incoming commands. Any requester thus becomes an autho-
rized user, possibly with full privileges. This would not be possible 
if security protocols and strong access control mechanisms are not 
deactivated, which in turn leaves the implant fully exposed to 
attackers. Unfortunately, telling apart normal from emergency sce-
narios is far from trivial for the IMD, and nowadays the best way to 
provide an adequate security for IMDs is still an open problem. 
Security tensions between these two conflicting goals are thus cre-
ated, hence the importance of finding solutions that balance the 
security requirements to provide security in normal mode while 
guaranteeing safety during emergencies [98]. Several works (see, 
e.g., [17,10,55]) have proposed schemes in which the IMD can only 
be accessed by authorized entities and remain invisible for the 
remaining ones. The prevailing philosophy in most works is that 
in case of doubt about the patient's safety, security mechanisms 
should be relaxed and access must be granted. We will discuss in 
detail the most relevant proposals in this field later in Section 5. 
3.2. Threat modeling 
Security threats against the IMD can be categorized using the 
STRIDE methodology. The acronym stands for six general cate-
gories of attacks: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information 
disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege. Table 1 
relates each category with the security property attacked in each 
case and provides some examples. Generally it is assumed the fol-
lowing set of relations (listing the "security property" versus the 
linked threat): authentication - spoofing, integrity - tampering, 
non-repudiation - repudiation, confidentiality - information dis-
closure, availability - denial of service, authorization - elevation 
of privileges. Apart from these one-to-one connections, it should 
be noted that some threats may address various properties simul-
taneously, or that a single attack can be decomposed into individ-
ual threats. 
The six security properties addressed above have their usual 
meanings, although focused on the IMD domain: 
Authentication. The identity of parties must be correctly estab-
lished before performing any other operation. Within the 
domain of implantable medical devices, any device in the sys-
tem (IMDs, Programmer or External device) can be imperson-
ated. For instance, if the identity of the Programmer is 
supplanted it might be the starting point for an elevation of 
privileges attack. 
Integrity. Data, either stored in the device or being communi-
cated through the wireless link, can only be modified by autho-
rized parties. If there is not integrity checking mechanism on 
the IMD, data could be altered during the transmission over 
the insecure radio channel. Furthermore the IMD could accept 
malicious inputs, which could be employed to run a code injec-
tion attack [96]. On the other hand the lack of integrity checking 
would facilitate that the manipulation of the data stored on the 
IMD memory might be not detected - or be detected in a distant 
future. 
Non-repudiation. Operations performed by/on the IMD are 
kept securely in an access log. The attacker could focus on 
delete these inputs in order to cover her traces. On the other 
Table 1 
STRIDE categories and examples in the IMD domain. 
Security property Threats 
Authentication 
Integrity 
Impersonate the Programmer 
Impersonate the IMD 
Impersonate the external 
device 
Patient data tampering 
Malicious inputs 
Modify communications 
Non-repudiation Delete access logs 
Confidentiality 
Availability 
Authorization 
Repeated access attempts 
Disclose medical information 
Determine the type of IMD 
Disclose the existence of the 
IMD 
Track the IMD 
Drain the battery of the IMD 
Interfere with the IMD 
communication capabilities 
Flood the IMD with data 
Reprogram the IMD 
Update the therapy of the 
patient 
Switch-off the IMD 
Spoofing 
Tampering 
Repudiation 
Information disclosure 
Denial of service 
Elevation of privileges 
hand no all IMDs are equipped with a log system. If this were 
the case the adversary could repeatability try to gain access to 
the IMD without leaving any trail. Even if a log system is pre-
sent the events would be logged but no alarm would be trig-
gered to alert the IMD holder in case of a malicious event. 
Confidentiality. Data, either stored in the device or being com-
municated through the wireless link, can only be read by autho-
rized parties. In particular, IMDs and the Programmer 
communicate through the radio channel (401-406 MHz) and 
these communications are exposed to eavesdroppers. If com-
munications are not encrypted, an adversary could disclose pri-
vate information such as the IMD model or even medical 
information of the patient. This would compromise the privacy 
(data) of the implant holder. Even if communications are 
encrypted, an attacker could detect the presence of the implant 
or, even worse, track the movements of its holder. In this case 
the privacy location would be put at risk. 
Availability. The services offered by the IMD should be avail-
able to authorized parties at all times. Availability is crucial 
for IMDs since these devices are devoted to treat medical con-
ditions of their holders. Unfortunately, an IMD could be ren-
dered inaccessible through the blockage of the radio channel 
(active jamming). Alternatively the device might be overloaded 
by flooding the IMD with network traffic over the radio channel. 
This could be used to block the access to the device or to drain 
its battery. If the battery runs out of power, the device would 
become permanently inaccessible and the patient's health 
could be at risk. 
Authorization. An operation must be executed only if the 
requester has sufficient privileges to order it. For instance, ther-
apy parameters (e.g., voltage, current, thresholds, operation 
mode, etc.), cannot be updated by the patient and only doctors 
should be able to modify these. In this regard, re-programming 
the IMD must be done under the joint supervision of the doctor 
and a technician (typically from the manufacturing company of 
the IMD). On the other hand, the IMD must be kept running at 
all times and only be switched off under special circumstances 
that may threat the patient's life (e.g., cardiac surgery with elec-
trocautery devices). In the case of pacemakers, a magnetic field 
has to be applied near the device (over the patient chest) and 
this procedure must be authorized by the cardiologist. 
3.2A. Types of attackers 
At high level, attackers can be grouped into two main cate-
gories: active and passive (see Fig. 4): 
Passive eavesdropper. A passive attack can only listen to the 
channel and, therefore, getting access to the messages 
exchanged between the IMD and the Programmer. Assuming 
an insecure radio channel, a passive attacker is a direct threat 
to confidentiality and may threaten authentication. By just 
reading messages a passive attacker may determine whether 
a person carries an implant or not; find out what type of 
implant and other data such as its model and serial number; 
capture telemetry data and disclose private information about 
the patient, such as the ID of his health records, name, age, 
and conditions. In all cases, the overall result is a serious com-
promise of the patient's privacy. 
Active adversary. In this case, the adversary is not only capable 
of capturing messages exchanged over the radio channel, but 
also to send commands to the IMD, modify messages in transit 
before they reach the IMD or the Programmer, or just block 
them so that they never arrive. Attacks may involve a sequence 
of interceptions, interruptions, modifications, and generation of 
messages. The goals pursued by an active attacker are diverse. 
For example, he could indiscriminately request information 
from the IMD with the purpose of draining its battery. He could 
also attempt to modify the configuration of the device, disable 
therapies, or even induce a shock state to the patient [44]. 
It must be noted that it is not essential for the attacker (active or 
passive) to be physically close to the patient to conduct the attack 
[31]. Depending on the specific communication technology used 
for the radio link, the IMD could be reachable from a few meters 
(typically 1-2 m for MICS and WMTS [86,120] or even up to 
10 m in case of using advanced communication techniques [49]). 
Furthermore, communication devices can be acquired very easily 
nowadays; e.g., certain smartphones can perform this task. 
In summary, the technical means needed to carry out most 
attacks against IMDs are cheap and easy to acquire and use. As a 
consequence, passive attackers can easily eavesdrop sensitive 
information about an implant holder without much difficulty. 
Even if the attacker is not someone who attempts to threaten the 
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Fig. 4. Passive vs active adversaries. 
patient's safety, the data stored on it might be very valuable for 
many individuals and organizations. 
It is worth mentioning that the attacker could be the patient 
himself in a deliberate or involuntary attempt to sabotage his 
own implant. An example of this was reported in [90], where it 
is described how a patient who sent unauthorized commands to 
his insulin pump in order to gain unsupervised use of it ended 
up with a medical condition as his manipulation resulted in the 
ingestion of a very high dose of medication. 
Finally, apart from general system and channel vulnerabilities, 
attackers can manipulate a number of IMD-specific features to 
achieve their goals [1,47]: 
• Manipulation of the distance. Proximity refers to the distance 
between the attacker and the IMD. Many current proposals 
have some form of distance-based access control, allowing 
access to the IMD only if the Programmer is in short range. 
The rationale here is to force the attacker to be physically very 
close to the patient to conduct the attack. In practice, however, 
the attacker may use a compromised device in the proximity of 
the patient to launch the attack, including those used in medical 
facilities. 
• Manipulation of the IMD functions. IMDs are programmed to per-
form various activities such as sensing biomedical parameters 
in the body area where they are implanted, treat a medical con-
dition (actuating), processing gathered data, and communicate 
with other devices, either external or those in the IBN [131]. 
These functions can be misused by an attacker, for example 
by inducing an incorrect sensing to trigger a particular response 
in the implant. 
• Manipulation of the patient's status. As we will discuss later, the 
patient's status plays a key role in the design of many counter-
measures. For instance, an implanted biosensor can trigger an 
alarm if certain parameters fall out of the safety range. In some 
cases, such an alarm puts the IMD in emergency mode and 
automatically disables access control mechanisms. 
4. Limitations and trade-offs 
In this section, we first introduce a number of technological lim-
itations of current IMDs that restrict the sort of security mecha-
nisms that can be implemented on them. We next describe 
various trade-offs that arise when designing security measures 
for IMDs and that originate as a consequence of the IMD's compu-
tational limitations, the criticality of some of its functions, and the 
need to support an emergency mode of operation. 
4.1. Limitations 
IMDs have restricted capabilities in three separate dimensions: 
energy, storage, and computing power. All three of them have 
security implications, either because they can be misused or 
because they limit the security mechanisms that can be afforded. 
We next discuss them in more detail. 
Energy. IMDs are powered by an integrated battery that sup-
plies energy to all functions incorporated in the device (i.e., 
monitoring, treatment, communication, etc.). Once the IMD is 
implanted, the battery can last from 8 years in the case of neu-
rostimulators [81] up to 10 years in the case of pacemakers 
[76]. Battery usage has a direct impact over the implant life-
time. Once exhausted, it has to be replaced, which requires a 
surgical procedure with its associated risks. Some designs sup-
port batteries that can be charged wirelessly using magnetic 
fields, but organs close to the implant could be damaged. 
Some recent advances in this area can be found in [63,110,128]. 
Storage. Storage is quite limited in current IMDs. The memory 
available in the device is used to store historical data from dif-
ferent events and episodes that arise related with the patient's 
pathology. For instance, pacemakers and ICDs store ECG signals 
that occurred when the device decided to apply stimulation. 
The RAM memory of these device varies from 2 KB to 36 KB 
for the former, and from 128 KB to 1024 KB for the latter. In 
the case of ICDs, around 75% of this memory is devoted to store 
ECG signals [61]. Devices with low sensing rate like a Biostator 
Glucose Controller demand 8KB for data storage [113]. One 
consequence of incorporating a reduced memory on-chip is that 
security mechanisms have to consume as little memory as pos-
sible in order to save it for the potential storage requirements 
required by the medical functions of the device. One may won-
der about the possibility of increasing the amount of RAM 
memory in IMDs, since this sort of memory is not expensive 
nowadays. There seem to be two main reasons for keeping lim-
itations on the memory size. On the one hand, an increment on 
the amount of memory constitutes an increase in the size of the 
implant. This is a critical feature since IMDs are often located in 
or over the body of the patient and this parameter (device area) 
should be kept at a minimum. On the other hand, even if the 
device size is not an issue, increasing the amount of memory 
could impact the battery lifetime. Access operations (i.e., read-
ing, writing and erasing) are considered demanding in terms of 
power consumption [87], so performing them over a large 
amount of data would decrease the battery life and even 
exhaust it in a short time. 
Computing and communication. Both computing and com-
munication capabilities are extremely limited in IMDs due to 
power restrictions. Communication is the most energetically 
expensive task for the IMD. Hence, if communications are min-
imized, the battery life can be extended [101,104]. As for com-
putation, these are generally supported by a tiny 
microcontroller. For instance, the micro of a neurostimulator 
consumes an area of around 5 mm2, which is around forty times 
smaller than the area used for a general purpose microcon-
troller [58]. In general, the whole chip of the implant occupies 
an area of around several hundreds squared millimetres. 
4.2. Tensions and trade-offs 
As described in Section 3, and IMD can work in two operation 
modes: normal and emergency. Mechanisms designed to preserve 
security and privacy properties in both modes must consider vari-
ous tensions: 
Security vs safety. Nowadays in a real scenario it is common to 
assume that all the actors, both the legitimate (new generation 
of IMDs, external devices and programmers) and the illegiti-
mate ones (active and passive adversaries) will have network 
connectivity. This should lead to the inclusion of solid security 
solutions to prevent security incidents. In particular, in normal 
mode the IMD is vulnerable to a variety of attacks. Attackers 
could be physically situated at a long distance from the IMD 
and use its wireless communication capabilities—perhaps rely-
ing on a nearby proxy device—to receive data requests and per-
form update operations. Any proposed solution must guarantee 
basic security and privacy properties in this case. Nevertheless, 
during an emergency the medical personnel must be able to 
access the implant rapidly and without restrictions. Thus, while 
the use of strong security measures could provide a high level of 
protection, it can also put at risk the patient's safety during an 
emergency situation. The trade-off between safety and security 
is one of the most critical aspects in the design of security 
mechanisms for IMDs. 
Battery lifetime vs IMD capabilities. As discussed above, IMDs 
have severe restrictions in terms of energy consumption since 
extending the battery lifetime is an essential requirement. In 
turn, this also restricts the amount of computations and com-
munications involved in security functions. This motivates the 
design of new security and privacy mechanisms that are not 
very demanding in terms of computation, communications, 
and storage. An interesting fact in this regard was pointed out 
in [85]: power consumption increases drastically if the data 
transfer rate increases. Thus, although it may seem counterintu-
itive, it is preferable to rely on long transmissions at very low 
bit rate than on short data exchanges at high speed. 
Several solutions have addressed the problem of saving or 
recharging the battery of IMDs to postpone as much as possible 
its replacement. For example, in [125] Warwick et al. present an 
innovative solution to provide higher intelligence to neurostim-
ulators. The idea is to provide the implant with the capability to 
predict tremor conditions in Parkinsons' activity, so that only in 
that precise moment an stimulation on the sub-thalamus is 
triggered. Once the tremor has diminished, the implant stops 
the stimulation. Intelligent solutions like these could prolong 
the lifetime of the battery. 
Other approaches have suggested techniques to recharge the 
battery wirelessly. In [119], Arx and Najan propose to provide 
the implant with receiver (planar spiral) coils and accompany-
ing circuitry that are capable of receiving transmitted power 
from a few centimetres away. Another example can be found 
in [ 111 ], where an inductor with a parallel chip capacitor is pro-
posed. In this system, the inductor radiates energy by coupling 
a signal at the resonant frequency (300 MHz in this proposal). 
These systems would allow the IMDs to work without any bat-
tery, which would be highly desirable since the battery replace-
ment procedure would be avoided [132]. 
Using a different approach, Wang and Song proposed to trans-
form mechanical energy obtained from the movement of the 
patient's muscles into electrical energy [122]. Using this tech-
nology, the IMD could be automatically and continuously 
recharged by the patient's physical activity. 
Unfortunately, neither these solutions nor others recently pro-
posed (e.g., [63,110,128]) can be nowadays found implemented 
in commercial IMDs. Therefore, any security measure for 
implants must take into account existing energy restrictions 
and potential impacts on the battery life. Furthermore, as there 
are attacks that pursue to waste the battery of the IMD, security 
functions should not make this easier (e.g., by allowing the 
attacker to drain the battery by misusing security mechanisms). 
Answering time. If the interaction with the implant takes too 
much time because of the overhead imposed by security con-
trols, the patient's safety could be put at risk. Such controls 
should be analyzed to guarantee that their worst-case latency 
is within a reasonable range. 
In summary, tensions between safety (i.e., guaranteeing access 
in critical conditions) and security (allowing access only to autho-
rized entities), coupled with the restrictions present in current IMD 
platforms, introduce unique challenges in the development of ade-
quate security mechanisms for IMDs. Adapting solutions proposed 
for other similar environments (e.g., wireless sensor networks) is 
not straightforward, since questions such as how security mecha-
nisms should behave in emergency mode—and, most importantly, 
guaranteeing that the existence of this mode is not abused by an 
attacker—are still open problems. 
5. Protection measures 
In this section, we discuss different security mechanisms that 
have been proposed to thwart security threats in IMDs. Many of 
these proposals explicitly address the trade-offs and tensions pre-
viously discussed, while others simply focus on counteracting 
specific attacks. The majority are preventive and attempt to stop 
attacks from happening in the first place, although detection and 
correction mechanisms have been also suggested. 
Ideally, the inclusion of security measures should not require 
any modification of the IMD, as this would imply its replacement 
and, therefore, a surgical procedure. The alternative would be 
implementing security functions in external devices or indepen-
dent modules of the IMD chip. Under this approach, the software 
running on the implant would be exclusively used to treat the 
patient's medical condition. 
As discussed above, a major problem with most security mea-
sures is that they could put at risk the patient's safety in emer-
gency situations if they cannot be easily disabled. The use of 
some form of "backdoor" to bypass security could be a straightfor-
ward solution, though it is too easily manipulable by an attacker. 
Fig. 5 provides a classification of the security mechanisms that 
will be discussed throughout this section. 
Fig. 5. Protection mechanisms proposed for IMDs. 
5.1. No security 
Many IMDs, particularly the older generations without wireless 
communication capabilities, have no security mechanisms at all 
[78,80]. This is unacceptable for the newest generations of IMDs 
in which the presence of communication capabilities may jeopar-
dize the patient's safety. 
5.2. Auditing 
One of the simplest security mechanisms consists of constantly 
registering all accesses—authorized or not—together with the 
patient's status. This is a measure aimed at facilitating the detec-
tion of non-permitted actions and constitutes a valuable source 
of evidences to take subsequent actions. Therefore, auditing helps 
to combat threats against non-repudiation. Unlikely, it does not 
prevent the occurrence of attacks, but may act as a deterrent ele-
ment if appropriately implemented, i.e., if it is not possible for an 
attacker to compromise the audit log and if it facilitates attribution 
of the attack. As a consequence of this, this sort of solutions should 
be complemented with appropriate mechanisms to detect and 
block such attacks, as well as measures to prevent them from hap-
pening in the first place (e.g., cryptographic or access control 
solutions). 
The main problem that auditing proposals face is the limited 
amount of memory available in IMDs. For instance, the whole 
memory of an ICD is less than 1 MB and around 75% of this mem-
ory is used for medical functions. In that a case, only a few hun-
dreds kilobytes could be used for logging events, which is 
extremely restricted. An additional memory could be added to 
the chip, but this would increase the size of the IMD, which is 
not recommendable. 
To avoid increasing the memory of IMDs, the logging task can 
rely on an external device without memory and computation lim-
itations. One example in the context of RFID systems is "RFID 
Guardian" [95], which collects and analyzes evidences of all events 
that occur in a predetermined range. A similar approach, called 
MedMon, has been recently proposed for IMDs and e-Health appli-
cations [130]. The authors propose the use of an external device 
that works as a security monitor snooping and analyzing all com-
munications to and from the IMD. The events are locally stored in 
the external device and an alarm could be raised to alert the 
patient. A more drastic solution can include blocking the commu-
nication channel if a dangerous communication is detected. 
5.3. Cryptographic measures 
Cryptography-based security solutions strongly depend on 
cryptographic primitives, which can be categorized in three main 
groups [82], as shown in Fig. 5. Unkeyed primitives, such as hash 
functions or one-way permutations, are cryptographic tools that 
do not use any key. Within the keyed cryptographic tools we can 
distinguish between symmetric-key and public-key primitives. In 
symmetric-key primitives a secret key is shared between the 
trusted entities. The type of primitives in this category is varied 
including symmetric key ciphers (block and stream ciphers), mes-
sage authentication codes (MACs), pseudorandom sequences and 
identification primitives. On the other hand, public-key ciphers 
and signatures are two examples of asymmetric-key primitives. 
In this type of algorithms two keys are used, one of them is public 
and the other one must be kept secret. 
In the context of IMDs, cryptographic measures are effective 
mechanisms to protect the wireless communication channel and 
the records stored in the device against tampering and information 
disclosure. Additionally, cryptographic protocols also provide a 
means to control and manage accesses to the IMD, thus providing 
protection against spoofing and, in some cases, elevation of privi-
lege attacks. Both symmetric [44,55] and public-key [25,112] 
schemes have been proposed for these applications, although the 
latter are considerably more expensive in terms of communication, 
computation, and power consumption. Protocols based on 
public-key cryptographic schemes often exchange a high number 
of messages, which makes them quite energy demanding since 
sending and receiving messages consume power. Furthermore, 
public-key ciphers result in complex circuits that consume exces-
sive resources (hardware and memory) and are inefficient in terms 
of power consumption [35,71]. Due to the resource limitations dis-
cussed above for the current generation of implants, solutions 
based on symmetric-key approaches are the preferred option. 
Standardized protocols like the one proposed in ISO/IEC 9798 rely 
on the use of symmetric primitives (i.e., symmetric encryption or 
keyed hash function) and the encrypted tokens include random 
numbers (a PRNG is often used for its generation) to guarantee 
freshness between sessions [59]. 
Symmetric cryptographic schemes suffer from the key distribu-
tion problem. In general, the IMD and other authorized devices 
such as the programmer need to share a key (or a set of keys) that 
is used to generate authentication tokens for gaining access to the 
IMD, and to encrypt communications. The suitability of a particular 
key distribution scheme depends on the type of IMD, the expected 
interactions with other parties, and other assumptions about the 
operational environment. For example, if the programmer and 
the IMD will have a lasting relationship, a pre-set key can be used. 
This solution could be valid when the programmer is always a 
device belonging to the patient or the physician. In these cases, a 
first approach consists of pre-loading a factor key on the autho-
rized devices. This factor might be renegotiated between the legit-
imate parties during the first communication session to update the 
key. We emphasize here that is crucial to protect these keys and 
guarantee that only authorized entities (i.e., the patient and 
healthcare staff) have access to the them [106]. Such keys will be 
used to build various cryptographic tokens (e.g., an authenticated 
token or an encrypted message) used in the transactions between 
legitimate entities in the system. 
Other solutions suggest that the cryptographic keys used by the 
IMD can be stored in an external wearable device such as a smart 
bracelet. Externalizing the key storage incurs a significant risk, as 
the loss of such a device (e.g., if the patient losses the bracelet or 
it gets damaged) would render the IMD inaccessible and/or will 
facilitate access to unauthorized users [32]. Some authors propose 
to print the key into the patient's skin using ultraviolet pigmenta-
tion (i.e., invisible tattoos) that can be read by medical personnel in 
case of emergency [103]. Note, however, that the keys might be 
read by an attacker who has physical access to the patient—its 
presence may be detected due to its proximity. 
In the case of sporadic communications with authorized devices 
that nonetheless do not know the access key, a key agreement pro-
tocol must be supported (e.g., RSA-based [112] or using physiolog-
ical signals [117]). 
Providing a confidential channel between the IMD and the pro-
grammer is another major goal when using cryptographic solu-
tions. Some approaches suggest to exploit the limited coverage of 
the physical layer during the initialization phase [74]. Most pro-
posals are based on symmetric ciphers [44], and some of them 
incorporate a key updating mechanism (e.g, a hash-chain based 
updating scheme [50]). Recently, Kaadan and Refai have proposed 
in [64] a novel cryptographic system with claimed military-grade 
security level that combines a one time pad cipher with a novel 
key distribution and authentication scheme. Other approaches, like 
the one discussed in [55], focus on hardware efficiency and pro-
pose the use of lightweight ciphers that offer tiny footprints with 
low power consumption. Recently, a new IMD architecture, 
evaluated on an artificial pancreas implant, has been proposed. In 
this case, the implant includes two separates cores (illness treat-
ment and security tasks), and the overhead for the security module 
in terms of hardware and energy consumption is minimal [113]. 
The use of standard cryptographic solutions to provide security 
services in IMDs has been criticized, both for usability reasons and 
for the lack of rigor in the analysis of many proposals [98]. The 
main drawbacks that would entail the exclusive use of these solu-
tions are [36]: 
Inalterability. Incorporating cryptographic mechanisms in the 
device implies that current implants must be re-designed and 
replaced. This will force patients to undergo a surgery proce-
dure only to get a more secure device, as the treatment func-
tions do not present any problem. 
Patient's safety. The use of cryptographic measures embedded 
in the device introduces some challenges for emergency situa-
tions in which the communication with the IMD is necessary 
even for unauthorized parties (i.e., programmers who does 
not know the access key). This problem is not present in solu-
tions based on external devices such as those discussed later 
in Section 5.4.2. 
Maintenance. As security measures are implemented in the 
device, there is an increment in the amount of software embed-
ded in the implant, which also implies a higher likelihood of 
errors. Many authors support the idea of restricting as much 
as possible the software running on the device, keeping just 
those functionalities needed to treat the medical condition for 
what it was designed. 
5.4. Access control 
Access control mechanisms prevent unauthorized and inappro-
priate uses of the IMD functions. Prior to proceed with a particular 
action (e.g., access, reading, reprogramming, etc.), the privileges of 
the requester are evaluated with the aim of assessing whether it is 
authorized to execute that particular action or not. In particular, 
permitted and forbidden operations are governed through access 
control policies that establish who can do what, possibly depend-
ing on the context in which the access request takes place. Note 
that access control is fully compatible with other security mea-
sures such as cryptographic protocols to protect the communica-
tion channel. Furthermore, access control generally requires 
previous authentication, as decisions on whether an operation is 
permitted or not are made on the basis on the identity of the 
requester, who must be previously established. 
We next describe a number of access control models suggested 
for IMDs and discuss their main advantages and limitations. 
5.4.3. Certificates and lists based solutions 
In [32], the authors present two classical authentication mech-
anisms adapted for IMDs. One is based on Access Control Lists 
(ACLs)—an implementation of discretionary access control models 
based on the access matrix, while the second relies on a Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI). The ACL defines which operations an authen-
ticated reader is authorized to execute. Such permissions are per-
manent once the ACL is programmed. Thus, although it can be 
reprogrammed in the future, it is intended for providing perma-
nent access to certain readers. Contrarily, in PKI-based solutions 
the relationship between the IMD and the reader is transitory. In 
particular, the reader will have to repeat the procedure for obtain-
ing its certificate to authenticate with the IMD in each new session. 
In order to optimize the energy consumption in those cases 
where the reader communicates frequently with the IMD, the PKI 
and ACL approaches can be combined. For instance, the first time 
the reader is authenticated with the IMD, it will use its certificate. 
After that, this particular reader is registered in the ACL, since 
using this approach is more efficient in terms of energy consump-
tion than PKI-based solutions. 
One critical point is that the PKI and the certificate directories 
should be publicly—and permanently—accessible through the 
Internet. Consider, for example, a patient suffering an emergency 
condition while visiting a foreign country or just a different hospi-
tal. The medical personnel should be able to obtain the required 
credentials. Connectivity or authentication problems with the PKI 
may prevent them from gaining the required credentials to modify 
or disable the IMD, which in some cases may threaten the patient's 
safety. Therefore, the needed PKI is very demanding in the sense 
that is global, a large number of participants are involved, and a 
huge set of iterations are possible - similar requirements are 
demanded to the PKI that is used in the borders with the new 
e-passports [91]. 
5.4.2. Delegation in external devices 
Some authors have suggested to make use of an external device 
to control accesses to the IMD. Such devices would not be 
implanted in the patient's body, and part or all of the security func-
tions would be delegated to them. This presents several benefits. On 
the one hand, the IMD would save battery life since security-related 
computations are performed externally. On the other hand, a single 
device can integrate a number of security capabilities, such as 
auditing, key management, authentication, and access control. 
Furthermore, as most of these capabilities operate at the physical 
layer, other sort of solutions can be used at higher layers. 
Generally, the role of the external device is to act as a mediator 
between the programmer and the IMD. When the programmer 
needs to access the IMD, it first gains access to the external device 
and then communicates with the IMD. In [22], the authors present 
a solution based on external devices named "Cloaker". The IMD 
periodically checks the presence of the Cloaker. While it is 
detected, the IMD remains silent. Therefore, the Cloaker will pro-
vide security to the patient while he holds it. Otherwise, the com-
munications with the IMD are fully open to all readers. Using this 
approach, in an emergency condition it would suffice to remove 
the Cloaker from the patient to get full access to the device. 
The authors of [22] provide a number of ideas about the role 
that such an external device could play. Two different possibilities 
are identified: 
• The Cloaker would mediate in all exchanges until the IMD and 
the programmer successfully finish a key exchange. After that, 
both parties directly communicate with each other over a 
secure channel built using the shared key. The external device 
does not participate in such communications. 
• A different possibility is having the Cloaker involved in all com-
munications between the IMD and the programmer. In this 
case, all packets pass through it, which would allow to record 
them (for example, for a subsequent forensic analysis) and even 
implement filtering and attack detection functions. Note, how-
ever, that in this setting the Cloaker becomes a single point of 
failure, so any malfunction or degradation in performance will 
affect the availability of the IMD. 
Solutions based on external devices such as the one presented 
in [22] attempt to balance the security tensions described in 
Section 4. Security mechanisms are offered only in normal opera-
tion and the safety of the patient is guaranteed in emergency con-
ditions. Nevertheless, there are still some open questions that have 
not been definitely addressed, including: 
• The constant detection of the Cloaker by the IMD is not trivial. 
The authors proposed two ways to do this. In the first case, 
the IMD sends a "hello" message to the Cloaker whenever an 
incoming message is detected. Another, more restrictive way 
consists of the IMD periodically sending "hello" messages to 
the Cloaker to check its presence. The result is stored in just 
one bit that indicates whether the Cloaker is present or not. 
• Both schemes discussed above are inefficient in terms of energy 
consumption as a consequence of the messages exchanged to 
check the presence of the external device. The first solution 
avoids a continuous flow of requests to the Cloaker, but renders 
the system more vulnerable since the adversary knows the 
exact time when the Cloaker would be interrogated. Thus, the 
attacker could send a fake request to the Cloaker and then 
impersonate it. Contrarily, the second approach is much more 
secure but requires the IMD to continuously check the presence 
of the Cloaker. 
• The authors do not address the problem of how deal with an 
attack that causes interferences in the communication channel 
between the IMD and the Cloaker. 
• Finally, it is worth mentioning that [22] is not a definite solu-
tions and the authors do not recommend its immediate 
adoption. 
Another solution based on external devices is "RFID Guardian", 
proposed in [95]. RFID Guardian registers all devices in its range, 
manages keys, authenticates programmers that request access to 
the IMD, and blocks all unauthorized entities. Using this approach, 
all the devices in the neighborhood of the Guardian (i.e., about 1 or 
2 m according to [95]) are detected and corrective measures could 
be enforced if needed. Although the solution was originally pro-
posed in the context of RFID systems, the approach can be easily 
adapted to IMDs. The authors propose to integrate the Guardian 
into a device that the user (patient) always holds, such as a smart-
phone or a smart wearable device (e.g., a watch, a bracelet, etc.). 
Other approaches are based on the use of hardware tokens. 
There is a wide variety of these devices, including disconnected 
and connected tokens, smart cards, bluetooth tokens, etc. In this 
case, the device stores a password shared with the IMD. The med-
ical personnel would use this key to access the implant. The main 
drawback is the same as in other solutions based on external 
devices: if the token is lost or the patient forgets to carry it under 
an emergency condition, the IMD would be inaccessible [3]. 
Gollakota et al. proposed the use of an external device, named 
"shield" [39,38], that acts as an intermediary so that all communi-
cations between the IMD and the programmer pass through it. The 
shield protects the communication channel by jamming messages 
sent to and from the IMD in such a way that no other entity can 
decode them. Similarly, it protects the IMD from unauthorized 
devices by jamming all messages coming from them. Fraudulent 
messages are rendered unusable after the jamming and the IMD 
would discard them simply by its inability to interpret them, thus 
preventing the execution of malicious actions. 
In summary, the main advantage of solutions based on external 
devices is that they offer a high protection level against unautho-
rized commands. The IMD will not respond to malicious 
re-programming commands or attacks to drain the battery. Their 
main drawbacks include: 
• If the patient forgets the external device, the IMD would 
respond to all incoming (authorized or not) requests, which is 
only necessary in emergency mode. 
• These solutions do not generally consider scenarios in which 
the external device is replaced by a malicious one. In this 
case, the security and privacy of the IMD would be highly 
compromised. 
• The external device is fully visible to external entities, which 
can reveal sensitive information about the patient's medical 
condition. Moreover, some authors have pointed out that it is 
a constant reminder to the patient about his medical condition. 
• These proposals often assume that the external device is a 
trusted entity. Nevertheless, this entity can be compromised 
or act maliciously. For instance, packets can be altered (e.g., flip-
ping certain bits), dropped out, or blocked, which would render 
inoperative the communication with the IMD. 
5.4.3. Trusting other implantable devices 
In [47] it is proposed the idea of using a subcutaneous button 
that opens access to the IMD only after being pressed. This 
approach would protect the implant from all incoming communi-
cations until the patient deliberately presses the button, which 
can be done only in controlled environments. Note, however, that 
this would fail to protect the IMD if the adversary has physical con-
tact with the victim and can press the button, or leave an attacking 
device in the proximity of the patient waiting for the IMD to be 
accessible. 
The same authors also present the notion of an "IMD Hub", this 
being an implantable device that works as a network switch for all 
the devices in the IBN and also plays the role of and authentication 
center. This approach suffers from an excessive trust on a unique 
central device, so the use of more connected hubs could be a more 
interesting approach both for security and performance reasons. 
5.4.4. Proximity-based access control 
These solutions base the access decisions on the distance 
between the programmer and the IMD, allowing only communica-
tions with devices located at a short distance from the IMD [95]. In 
certain applications, it has been suggested that this can be 
achieved by having the IMD equipped with a magnetic switch. 
This is just a magnetic sensor that detects the magnetic field gen-
erated by programmers in its proximity. Only after this switch has 
been activated the IMD will become available. After this, the IMD 
would send to the programmer the key to be used for subsequent 
communications during this session. Unfortunately, apart from 
security issues, it is unclear whether these solutions are safe 
enough, since having a magnetic field close to the implant might 
alter its functioning [70]. 
Other solutions are based on classical distance bounding proto-
cols, these being schemes that compute an upper bound for the 
distance between two devices. In [93], Rasmussen et al. propose 
a device paring protocol in which the IMD and the programmer 
obtain a shared key. Messages are sent through an ultrasonic chan-
nel and the response times—i.e., the time between sending a 
request and receiving an answer—are used to estimate the distance 
between the devices. This process can be repeated several times to 
upper bound the estimation. If the computed distance is less than a 
fixed threshold, the communication with the IMD continues; 
otherwise, it is interrupted. It is also worth mentioning that some 
authors consider that response times in the protocol could serve as 
a deterrent against replay attacks [32], as the device could detect 
old request being replayed and reject them. 
Normal and emergency operation modes are considered in [93]. 
While in normal model, the paring protocol is executed and a ses-
sion key is established. This process is carried out assuming that 
the IMD and the programmer initially share a secret key. When 
in emergency mode, the shared key established above, which is 
probably stored in an authorization token but the patient could 
have forgotten it, may be unknown. To address this, the authors 
propose a mechanism to deal with this contingency. In detail, they 
propose a scheme to generate a temporary secret key so that the 
paring protocol can be executed. This is an alternative to the use 
of the magnetic switch previously described. In this case, the pro-
grammer has to be within the emergency range, which is shorter 
than in normal operation mode. 
Distance-based solutions assume that a reader that is close to 
the IMD is not an adversary. It can be a legitimate programmer 
with the required credentials and within permitted range for nor-
mal mode. Alternatively, it could be a legitimate reader but with-
out the authorization tokens in an emergency condition and 
located very close (i.e., in emergency range) to the IMD. This leads 
to two major disadvantages that have not being considered by this 
sort of protocols: 
• The IMD can be compromised if the adversary is within the 
defined range. It would be desirable to guarantee the security 
of the patient independently of the distance an attacker can 
be. There are many daily situations in which the attacker can 
get very close to the IMD, such as in a public transport vehicle 
and at the office. In other cases, the attacker can plant a pro-
grammer device close enough to the patient's body and use it 
as a proxy for conducting his activities. Moreover, the attacker 
can be the patient himself trying to deliberately manipulate 
the IMD. 
• There are techniques that allow an adversary to simulate being 
within the permitted range when in reality he is at a longer dis-
tance. This is a key limitation for any protocol based exclusively 
on the computed distance. 
5.4.5. Biometric measures 
Biometrics refers to a number of identification techniques based 
on the patient's physical characteristics, such as his fingerprint, iris 
pattern, voice, and hand [8,92]. Interested readers can find in [77] 
more details about the use of biometrics in the healthcare context. 
In [51], Hei and Du propose a solution that restricts access to 
authorized entities and deals with emergency situations where 
the patient can be unconscious or not holding his credentials 
(e.g., an external authorization token). The scheme uses biometric 
features from the patient in two separate steps or levels. Level 1 
employs basic biometric information, such as fingerprints, iris 
color, and the patient's weight. Once level 1 is passed, level-2 
authentication must be passed too in order to finally get access 
to the device. For that, biometric information extracted from the 
patient's iris must be provided. That information is pre-stored as 
a key in the memory of the IMD. Iris-based authentication has a 
high accuracy and is very efficient. Furthermore, to obtain a good 
snapshot of the iris a near infrared camera is needed, and the user 
has to be at a distance of between fifty and seventy centimetres, 
which is a very short range. As consequence of this, the patient 
would easily detect an attacker due to his proximity in many 
situations. 
Similarly, in [127] Xu et al. propose the use of ECG (electrocar-
diograms) signals to generate the patient's secret key. By using this 
the scheme avoids the need for pre-stored keys and the associated 
key distribution problem. Access control is guaranteed by a crypto-
graphic protocol that employs this ECG-based key. On the other 
hand, communications between the IMD and the reader are coor-
dinated by an external device named IMDGuard that is very similar 
to the RFID Guardian proposed in [95]. The presence of the 
IMDGuard means that the IMD works under normal mode and 
ECG-based access control is used. When the IMDGuard is absent, 
communications are not protected and access control is not 
enforced, which would allow anyone (e.g., medical personnel in 
an emergency situation, but also an adversary) to interact with 
the implant. A recent and detailed study about the use of ECG sig-
nals for key generation can be found in [99]. 
In certain cases, biometric techniques can be easier to apply 
than solutions based on shared keys, since the key distribution 
problem is avoided and it is harder for the attacker to disclose 
the keys. In principle, the adversary could not impersonate the pro-
grammer or the IMDGuard unless he has physical contact with the 
patient. Despite this, biometric-based approaches have two main 
drawbacks: 
• Firstly, the physical presence of the patient is needed. This is 
certainly not a disadvantage in an emergency situation, where 
the patient is physically located in the emergency room or 
equivalent. Unfortunately, this is not the case when medical 
personnel will attempt to access the IMD remotely. 
• Secondly, biometric features are never perfect. Two measures 
taken at different times, or even acquired simultaneously but 
using two reading devices, could generate different results. A 
straightforward use of such measures might generate wrong 
keys, when in reality the user is authorized. Error correction 
techniques are used to avoid this [2,14]. This problem is known 
as truth rejection rate and implies that not all biometric data 
can be used for key generation (or authentication). Thus, the 
measure has to be gathered from body parts so that the differ-
ences between measures are within a acceptable range and can 
be corrected [13]. 
5.5. Anomaly detection 
The availability of the IMD functions is crucial since the treat-
ment—and even the patient's life—can be compromised otherwise. 
If an attack is detected, the patient can be informed (e.g., by a noti-
fication mechanism) or the device can be rendered inaccessible via 
switching off the communications (or jamming the channel) while 
the medical functions are kept running. The difficulty to prevent 
this sort of attacks mainly arises from the use of the wireless com-
munication channel. Communication between the IMD and the 
reader starts with the IMD authenticating the reader. If the reader 
does not pass the authentication step, the communication is inter-
rupted. This consumes resources in the IMD and, therefore, can be 
exploited by an adversary who, for example, repeatedly attempts 
to communicate with the IMD. The result would be a classical 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack in which the battery level could be 
drastically reduced and memory/storage could be also affected— 
in each authentication, some registers are used to store security 
values such as session tokens and logs. In general, this sort of 
attacks are known as Resource Depletion (RD) attacks and focus 
on wasting the resources of the IMD [57]. They are very easy to 
implement and their consequences can be very harmful as the bat-
tery life of the IMD could be shortened from several yeas to a few 
weeks just by sending dummy requests. 
Standard cryptographic solutions do not prevent these attacks, 
and existing studies about RD attacks in sensors networks [94] 
are not directly applicable to IMDs since implants have more sev-
ere resource restrictions. Moreover, there is an extra difficultly for 
adding new resources—the implant is within the body, which is not 
the case of sensor networks. This motivates the need for designing 
solutions that take into account the fact that these devices will be 
used within a human body. 
In the context of IMDs, the combined use of pattern/behavior 
analysis and notification systems is the most widely used solution 
to counter RD attacks. Notification systems inform the patient 
through an alarm signal (e.g., a sound or vibration) when particular 
events happen, such as when the IMD establishes communication 
with a external device [43] or when certain biomedical parameters 
fall out of the normal range [23]. Such alarms are only informative. 
Thus, notification does not prevent attacks from happening, 
although alerting the patient may be valuable to make him aware 
of unexpected ongoing communication activity. One major draw-
back of these approaches is that they do not work properly in 
acoustically noisy environments. Besides, alarms have an associ-
ated energy consumption that should not be underestimated. As 
in the case of auditing, notification mechanisms alone are insuffi-
cient and should be complemented with other solutions. 
By leveraging the fact that the wireless communications 
between an IMD and a reader follow a set of observable patterns 
(e.g., frequency, localization, patient conditions, etc.), Hei et al. pro-
pose in [52] a mechanism against RD attacks with an average 
detection rate over 90%. The scheme uses a Support Vector 
Machine (SVM), which is assumed to run in the patient's phone. 
In detail, the authors consider five kinds of input data to carry 
out detection: reader action type (i.e., the action(s) the reader 
can execute on the IMD, where the set of actions depends on the 
type of implant); the time interval of the same reader action; the 
location (e.g., home or hospital); the time; and the day (e.g., weekly 
or weekend). Once trained, the classifier will determine whether a 
pattern is valid or not. For instance, if a particular type of request is 
always sent from the doctor office, an attempt of the same request 
from a different location would raise an alarm. The overall system 
works as follows. Each time the reader attempts to contact with 
the IMD, the latter sends a message to the mobile phone of the 
patient with the access pattern. The phone executes the classifica-
tion algorithm and returns an output that is sent back to the IMD. 
Depending on that output, three actions are possible: (1) the input 
vector is considered legitimate. In this case the mobile sends a " 1 " 
(true) to the IMD and the communication with the reader contin-
ues; (2) the input vector does not correspond with any of the 
allowed patterns, in which case the phone sends a "0" (false). 
The request may come from an attacker and the IMD turns into 
sleep mode to avoid RD attacks; (3) If it is unclear whether the 
input vector is legitimate or an attack, an alarm is triggered (e.g., 
an audible alarm) to inform the patient, who must decide if the 
communication is permitted. 
The proposal in [52] has three main drawbacks. Firstly, the 
scheme assumes that the IMD is always running in normal mode 
and does not consider emergency conditions in which legitimate 
access patterns could be certainly anomalous. If that is the case, 
access to the IMD would be rejected, which could result in severe 
consequences for the patient's safety. Secondly, the proposal inher-
its some disadvantages from schemes that base its security on an 
external device—the mobile phone, in this case, as discussed in 
Section 5.4.2. Finally, but not less important, the patient has the 
responsibility of making a decision in case the SVM cannot classify 
the input data. 
Instead of using patterns, Henry et al. have recently proposed in 
[53] a system to detect malicious/anomalous use of an insulin 
pump. In particular, the administration of insulin dosages is 
detected by tracking the acoustic bowel sounds. The events are 
logged and then used for checking the proper system operation. 
The proposal is a passive solution and does not offer protection 
in real-time. Moreover, as in [52], the system is based on the use 
of an external device needed to measure abdominal sounds. 
A new defense method for IMDs based on wireless monitoring 
and anomaly detection is proposed in [130]. The authors propose 
the use of a medical security monitor, named MedMon, which 
eavesdrops communications to and from the IMD. Captured traffic 
is then passed for analysis to a multi-layer anomaly detection sys-
tem. If a malicious transaction is detected, the user can be 
informed (passive response) or alternatively the system can render 
the IMD inaccessible via active jamming (active response). 
Jamming refers to the transmission of radio signals with the pur-
pose of impeding communications in the channel by reducing 
the signal-to-noise ratio. In this case, jamming is used to protect 
the IMD from being accessible to the adversary. The main draw-
back of this proposal is that the whole security resides on an exter-
nal device, but it has the advantage of being applicable on existing 
devices without any modification. In line with MedMon, Darji and 
Trivedi have recently proposed a system for detecting active 
attacks [18]. They propose the use of an external proxy device 
equipped with several antennas that builds a signature of autho-
rized readers/programmers based on their position. Positions are 
estimated through triangulation techniques. The proposal seems 
effective for static scenarios but not for dynamic ones. 
5.6. Overriding access control 
Although strictly speaking overriding access control mecha-
nisms is not a protection measure, we have included these solu-
tions here for completeness. Furthermore, in an emergency 
situation keeping the patient alive is more crucial than maintaining 
the IMD security protections fully functioning. 
Access control models are often too inflexible. The access policy 
is generally established at the design phase, setting what actions 
are allowed, by which entities and under what circumstances. 
However, during the system life it is possible that unexpected 
and unanticipated situations may arise in which access to the 
implant is vital. For instance, in the context of IMDs and under 
an emergency condition the usage scenarios are unpredictable. 
Since guaranteeing the patient's safety is a priority, it is mandatory 
that access requirements can be removed if it becomes necessary. 
This type of situations give rise to a family of solutions collectively 
known as "Breaking-the-Glass" (BTG) that allows to switch the 
access control requirements off in critical or unknown situations 
for the system. This would facilitate the access to the implant 
under a emergency condition, although it also opens the door to 
a number of security vulnerabilities. 
A typical proposal of a BTG policy can be found in [29]. Even 
though this work is not focused on IMDs, it can be adapted easily. 
In this case, the access controls requirements can be suppressed 
even if the entity previously did not have privileges to do that. 
The BTG is complemented with a non-repudiation mechanism that 
facilitates a subsequent analysis of the accesses carried out. The 
authors define a series of steps that must be executed in a precise 
order to override access control. First, when a user requests access, 
the system checks if he has the required privileges. If the answer is 
negative, the system may give him access under the BTG modality 
provided that the user accepts that all the actions will be recorded. 
If so, he gets access to the system and assume all responsibilities. 
In [97], Rissanen et al. propose a model that distinguishes 
between allowed actions, forbidden actions, and all those that 
can be executed (possible actions). The intersection between the 
sets of possible and forbidden actions represents the actions that 
can be allowed when overriding the access control policy. 
The classical Clark-Wilson access control model for data integ-
rity [15] also provides a reference framework for BTG policies. In 
this case, the basic steps needed in a BTG system are reduced to 
[7]: 
1. Pre-staging break-glass accounts: emergency accounts are cre-
ated in advance, so users and passwords are generated for these 
special cases. 
2. Distributing accounts: pres-stages accounts are efficiently man-
aged to guarantee that the required access data is available in 
appropriate and reasonable manner in case of emergency. 
3. Monitoring the usage of the accounts: the system must be audited 
while being accessed during an emergency condition. 
4. Cleaning up: once access in the emergency mode concludes, new 
access accounts are generated and the old ones are revoked, 
thus avoiding temporary-authorized users have a permanent 
access to the system. 
Obviously, a set of measures to ensure the proper functioning of 
the system are required as consequence of bypassing the access 
control in a BTG system [42,89,105]: 
1. Users must accept their new privileges, warning them of the 
possible consequences of their acts. 
2. The system must record the actions performed by each user. 
A posterior analysis will determine if the access was legitimate 
or not. For that, access requests can be stored together with the 
system status, which could help to conclude whether the access 
was justified by the circumstances or not. As in the case of the 
auditing mechanisms described in Section 5.2, this can be 
considered as a deterrence measure. 
3. In an emergency condition, all access operations must be mon-
itored in real time to grant those privileges needed for them to 
be executed. Furthermore, the system has to be in emergency 
mode only while the emergency lasts, returning to the previous 
access policy as soon as possible. 
4. The privileges granted in such situations must be kept to the 
minimum required to perform the task, but not more. 
5. Some proposals like [89] go one step beyond and consider 
whether the requested action is reversible or not. Thus, actions 
executed by a user with enhanced privileges due to an 
emergency condition should be reversible, in such a way that 
unjustified actions can be undone. 
As a practical implementation, the work presented in [7] by 
Brucker and Petritsch describes the integration of a standard access 
control model with a BTG policy and discusses the improvements 
in the architecture. Similarly, a context-based access control mech-
anism is proposed in [45], which depends on four factors: time, 
location, identity, and history of events. 
In summary, BTG policies extend access control policies to crit-
ical situations, dynamically grating privileges to users who require 
them to execute an essential action. This type of policies are very 
important since it is unrealistic to assume that all possible situa-
tions will be considered at design time. In fact, in the case of 
IMDs the situations in which an emergency can appear are unpre-
dictable and, in the majority of the cases, a successful management 
of the emergency situation depends on the access being granted in 
time. As for the proposals discussed above, some of its properties 
are difficult to guarantee a priori, such as for example ensuring that 
the system can recover from the BTG policy by allowing only rever-
sible actions (in most emergency situations the required actions 
are clearly irreversible). Therefore, although these measures aim 
at solving the tension between security and patient's safety, its 
usage can be risky. In general, it would be necessary to carefully 
define what an emergency situation is and providing the IMD with 
the means necessary to recognize it. However, as this would have 
to be done at the design phase, it somehow contradicts the basic 
Table 2 
Security solutions for IMDs. 
Measure 
No security 
Auditing 
Cryptographic measures 
AC Certificates and lists 
External devices 
Internal devices 
Proximity 
Biometrics 
Anomaly detection 
BTG policies 
Type 
* 
Detection 
Protection 
Protection 
Protection 
Protection 
Protection 
Protection 
Protection 
Protection 
Safety 
-
-
-
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
BTG motivation, namely that critical situations are unpredictable 
and must be detected at execution time. 
5.7. Summary 
Table 2 provides an overview of the proposals discussed 
throughout this section, detailing for each one of them its main 
purposes and how it affects three main goals: security, patient's 
safety, and battery life. Furthermore, in relation with STRIDE 
methodology, we show the security properties addressed. 
6. Conclusions 
Implantable Medical Devices improve the quality of life of 
patients and, in some cases, play an important role in keeping them 
alive. The new generation of IMDs are increasingly incorporating 
more computing and communication capabilities. In this article, 
we argued that advances on novel and smarter IMD designs must 
incorporate security solutions by design in order to provide the 
user with both safety and security guarantees. We have provided 
a comprehensive overview of the main security problems associ-
ated to the newest IMDs and have discussed how, in some cases, 
the patient's health can be seriously threatened by a malicious 
adversary. It is therefore evident that security mechanisms have 
to be incorporated into these devices. Further cooperation among 
researchers coming from manufacturing technologies, bioengi-
neering, and computer security are necessary to guarantee both 
the patient's safety and the privacy and security of the data and 
communications. 
Given the tensions among the different security objectives and 
the solutions proposed so far, it is unclear what the optimal choice 
would be. The question still remains an open problem. Many pro-
posals provide a reasonably high security level but require too 
many resources (e.g., memory or computation), which is infeasible 
taking into consideration the need to save battery life. 
Alternatively, lightweight solutions are often vulnerable to attacks 
as a consequence of their weak designs. 
Apart from purely engineering solutions, the procedures that 
both the medical personnel and the patients follow when interact-
ing with the implants have to be considered, and existing regula-
tions and standards should be also reviewed. However, nowadays 
these aspects are essentially ignored [115]. Devices must be used 
responsibly, and users must know various details about its func-
tioning and the possible threats in order to raise security 
awareness. 
Although some existing security solutions can be effective from 
a theoretical point of view, patients are very likely to reject them. 
The IMD is a computer system that is embedded into the human 
body. This is nowadays a special and delicate situation and the user 
opinion should be taken into account as far as possible. Interested 
Security Battery life Security properties addressed 
- * None 
- + Non-Repudiation 
+ ± Authentication, Confidentiality, Integrity 
+ ± Authorization (+Authentication) 
± + 
+ * 
± * 
+ * 
+ + Authorization, Availability 
- * Authorization during emergencies 
Legend: + Positive. - Negative. ± Both positive and negative effects. * No influence. 
readers can find in [21] some guidelines for designing security sys-
tems for IMDs considering the patient's point of view. 
Looking even further ahead, medical implants open the door to 
other types of devices to improve human abilities, such as memory 
or perception, or even integrate our physiology with silicon-based 
components to improve our body. This looks certainly far ahead 
nowadays, but perhaps pacemakers and neurostimulators were 
also considered a remote possibility before they were introduced 
[123]. The field of computer security has to be ready to adapt 
and incorporate solutions for this new setting at the design phases, 
avoiding the develop-then-patch approach that has provided dis-
astrous results for the Internet. 
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